

2 c0317

LY 2 continues the statecraft interest of LY 12–13, but with new elements: science, family virtues, and a renewed interest in teaching. It abandons the tolerance of war shown in 13:29–30 and adopts a civilian, even familial, stance. We place it in the period after Dž-jīng had assumed control of the Lǚ school. This probably occurred in 0321, and reduced Mencius’s role, precipitating his departure in 0320. LY 2 may have been a summary and update of LY 12–13, on the occasion of the first year of Píng-gūng of Lǚ, in 0317. Mencius was then in Lǚ, on leave from Chí for his mother’s funeral. Píng-gūng wanted to see him, but was dissuaded from doing so by one of his retinue (MC 1B16). It would seem that Mencius, however impractical his advice, did have the gift of attracting the notice of rulers. Under Dž-jīng’s leadership, on the other hand, the Lǚ school later found itself on the losing side at court. Firmly as the hereditary Kǔng line was now established, there must have been those in the Lǚ school who felt it had been a mistake to let the more worldly Mencius go.

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

[A. Virtuous Government]

┌ 2:1. The Master said, To conduct government by virtue can be compared to the North Star: it occupies its place, and the many stars bow before it.

The idea of the influence of the virtuous ruler appeared in 12:17, and that of a permanent maxim in 13:15; here they are joined with a new astronomical symbolism, the first time the physical world has served as a prototype, not a metaphor (compare 6:23), for the human world. This may reflect the theories of Dzōu Yěn 鄒衍, who apparently flourished in Chí at this time. Among ideas associated with him are the yīn/yáng duality, the Five Planets (wǔ-syíng 五行 “five walkers” or movable stars) cyclic dominance theory (Brooks **Earliest**), and a correspondence theory linking astral and terrestrial events, and offering a scientific way to predict the future and recover the past. All these ideas appear in the DJ (c0312). Dzōu Yěn’s geography seems to have been based on nested 3 × 3 square arrays, of which the Nine Yí of *9:14¹³ may be a schematic echo.

There was in this period no literal pole star, the immediate circumpolar region being essentially empty until much later times (Pankenier **Astrology**). Whether we imagine a polar void or (as the text seems to require) a polar star, the thrust of the saying is the magical power of inactivity. Bauer **Happiness** 21 notes the moral and physical force of the pivot-star’s “powerful calm.”

└ 2:2. The Master said, The 300 Poems: if with one saying I should epitomize them, it would be “In your thoughts, be without depravity.”

The idea of an epitome further develops the “basis” concept of 3:4 and the “constant maxim” concept of 13:15. This particular line (which, Waley argues, originally meant “Ah, without a flaw!”) is from Shī 297, the first poem in the Lǚ Sùng (Shī 297–300), meant as a “last word” on the Shī from its then-last section (the Shāng Sùng, Shī 301–305, came later). This cultural sanction for virtuous *thought* parallels the natural metaphor for virtuous *influence* in 2:1.

⌈ 2:3. The Master said, Lead them with government and regulate them by punishments, and the people will evade them with no sense of shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by ritual, and they will acquire a sense of shame – and moreover, they will be orderly.

The Legalist government by deterrent (chí 齊 is “to regulate, bring into line”) *will not work*; order can only be produced by strengthening internal motivation (compare 12:7). Eberhard **Guilt** 122 speculates that shame, as the inverse of honor, is more natural for the elite; here is an attempt to extend it downward. The focus on education is typical of LY 2. For reciprocity in ritual, see 3:19n.

⌋ 2:4. The Master said, At fifteen I was determined on learning, at thirty I was established, at forty I had no doubts, at fifty I understood the commands of Heaven, at sixty my ears were obedient, and at seventy I may follow what my heart desires without transgressing the limits.

The internalization of ethical ideals: (1) will to learn, (2) vision of the ideal, (3) resolving contradictions of principle, (4) grasping the *cosmic structure* of virtue, as in 2:1, a contemporary wrinkle which interrupts the psychological sequence, (5) overcoming inner resistance to ethical imperatives, and (6) transfiguring the inner impulse itself. The final state is like what the Buddhists call *isvara* 自在, the capacity to act without doing harm, which characterizes the Bodhisattva. If Confucius did not survive into his 71st year, as 03c evidence still suggests (see page 266), this would have been seen as from the very end of his life.

A precursor saying may have been, and the first two stages are still often taken, in terms of career progress. So interpreted, it defines a midlife career crisis for Analects readers. Hân Yw̄, in his 31st year, writing to a friend in 798, notes that he is now behind schedule for “establishing himself” with posterity (Hán **Jāng Jī**; translated up to the quotation in Hartman **Han** 161f).

[B. Filiality]

⌈ 2:5. M̀ng Yìdž asked about filiality. The Master said, Never disobey. Fán Ch́ was driving, and the Master told him, The descendant of the M̀ng asked me about filiality, and I replied, Never disobey. Fán Ch́ said, What does that mean? The Master said, When they are alive, serve them with propriety; when they are dead, inter them with propriety, and sacrifice to them with propriety.

Lǐ, the basis of r̀n in 12:1, here becomes the theoretical basis of filial piety. The noble questioner does not query the Master’s cryptic saying (compare 12:1/2), but takes it in its obvious sense “never disobey *parents*.” The Master provokes a clarifying question to show that what one should not disobey is not parents, but principles. See also 3:9, where ritual gives a constitutional context for relations that are liable to monopoly from the command end. This passage, like 13:15, asserts a right to judge, and even refuse, the demands of the ruler.

⌋ 2:6. M̀ng Wǔ-bwó asked about filiality. The Master said, When his father and mother are anxious only lest he may fall ill.

A good son does not cause his parents worry about his conduct, and he is so assiduous in caring for them that they fear that he may injure his own health. Wǔ-bwó, the son of Yìdž, gets more traditional advice than his father in 2:5.

┐ 2:7. Dǔ-yóu asked about filiality. The Master said, The filiality of the present day: it is merely what one might call being able to provide nourishment. But if we consider the dogs and horses, they all get their nourishment. If there is no respect, where is the difference?

The internalizing of values here affects not only filiality, which becomes an attitude rather than a set of actions, but also the word denoting the attitude. Jing 敬, in earlier passages mostly “assiduous” (in the performance of duties), somewhere in this vicinity acquires the later standard meaning “respectful” (previously rendered by gūng 恭). Note the distaste for the unfeeling manners of the “present,” which also comes through in 13:20.

└ 2:8. Dǔ-syà asked about filiality. The Master said, The *demeanor* is difficult. If there is work, the younger bear the toil of it; if there are wine and food, the elder get the best portions – did *this* ever count as filiality?

Again the Master shows contempt for outward observances, and fixes on a different crux: not the inward feeling of 2:7, but its expression in the demeanor. Mere considerate actions do not suffice.

[C. Higher and Lower Consistencies]

┐ 2:9. The Master said, I can talk all day with Hwéi, and he never disagrees with me; he seems to be stupid. But if, after he has withdrawn, I observe his personal conduct, it is adequate to serve as an illustration. *Hwéi* is not stupid.

The implication (compare 5:12) is that *the Master* is stupid, to have mistaken Hwéi’s ready inner assent for mere superficial acceptance (note the expectation that a good student will *challenge* the teacher). DDJ 20 (c0320) praises the seeming unworldly “stupidity” of the meditation adept.

└ 2:10. The Master said, See what he bases himself on, observe what he follows, find out what he is comfortable with. Where can the man hide? Where can the man hide?

The art of judging from incomplete evidence. As in 2:9, judgement of future performance is based on observation of present performance. This does not mean that the possession of one good quality guarantees other good qualities (a dangerous error which beginners frequently make), but, more subtly, that the *sources* and *influences* of action are a useful *predictor* of action.

┐ 2:11. The Master said, Warming up the old so as to understand the new: such a one can be a teacher.

We take ár 而 as resultative (“so as”) rather than connective (“and”) between the two clauses describing a teacher; compare MZ 46:17 (Mei **Ethical** 219), criticizing LY 7:1, to which this is a rejoinder. It reflects the position of a school head in charge of a body of received doctrine, but continually adapting it (“warming it up”) to make it applicable to new political and cultural needs.

└ 2:12. The Master said, The gentleman is not to be used as an implement.

For the deployment of lower staff according to their specific skills, see 13:25. This (like DDJ 28) objects to its application to people of the better sort, repeating the idea (see 9:2) that the gentleman is not a specialist, but needs scope for generality, as against the standard bureaucratic limitation of function.

┌ 2:13. Dǔ-gùng asked about the gentleman. The Master said, First he carries out his words, and then he remains consistent with them.

The keeping of promises has been a virtue from the beginning of the text; here, a new dimension is added: a *consistency of position* in the promises. The old loyalty concept included continuity in the object of loyalty, typically a person. As the state detaches itself from its ruler, a different basis of personal consistency is needed: an internalized loyalty, or integrity.

Waley's interpretation, followed by Dawson and Leys, in effect "first tests his words in practice and only then recommends them as guidelines," seems to us a forced reading of the final words, 從之 "follows them."

└ 2:14. The Master said, The gentleman is broad and not partial; the little man is partial and not broad.

The gentleman is consistent at the level of large principles; the little man, at that of precise loyalties. If we see this saying as associated with the foregoing, it seems to support our reading of the foregoing.

┌ 2:15. The Master said, If he studies and does not reflect, he will be rigid. If he reflects but does not study, he will be shaky.

This can quite satisfactorily be taken as asserting the need for both personal thought and attention to tradition, in maintaining the tradition (compare 2:11). With an eye to hints in earlier passages, we are inclined to see in "reflection" a specifically meditational component (compare *4:25 below).

└ 2:16. The Master said, If someone attacks from another end, he will do harm.

For the technical meaning of *dwān* 端 "end" in induction, compare 9:8. In the context of the paired 2:15, this passage may be aimed not at heterodox *ideas* (the usual explanation) but at other *ways of reasoning*. This rules out syncretic tendencies like the openness to Mician values such as "love," which in 12:22 was equated with Confucian *rǔn*. The limited acceptance of meditative insights in the paired 2:15 will, in a similar way, be reduced in the later 15:31^{15a}. The Confucian stance hardens, as the Hundred Schools debate leads its participants to define themselves more rigorously *as against each other*.

┌ 2:17. The Master said, Yóu, shall I teach you about knowing? To regard knowing it as knowing it; to regard *not* knowing it as *not* knowing it – *this* is knowing.

This famous advice to Dǔ-lù (for "not knowing *it*," we follow the Lǚ text, which has explicitly 弗知; *Shǐ-wǎn* 50) warns against overconfidence in knowledge. True wisdom 知 includes awareness 知 of the limits of knowledge 知.

└ 2:18. Dǔ-jāng was studying for a salaried position. The Master said, Hear much but omit what is doubtful, and speak circumspectly of the rest, and you will have few problems. See much but omit what is shaky, and act circumspectly on the rest, and you will have few regrets. If in your words you have few problems, and in your actions you have few regrets, salary will come along in due course.

A paired saying on the topic of doubtful knowledge. The seeming moral is not to base yourself on what you don't know, or don't *securely* know. We suspect that a prototype maxim may have recommended mere bureaucratic caution: an emphasis on the *avoidance of mistakes*. It is the unobjectionable, not the outstanding, who succeed. LY 2 here steps back from the bolder LY 12–13.

[D. Influencing the People]

┌ 2:19. Aī-gūng asked, What must I do so that the people will be submissive? Confucius replied, Raise up the straight and put them over the crooked, and the people will be submissive. Raise up the crooked and put them over the straight, and the people will not be submissive.

The Legalists recommended force, based on proclaimed law, as a means of securing public order. This response requires that those in charge of the people must themselves be models of behavior (see 2:3), and not mere enforcers.

└ 2:20. Jì Kāngdǔ asked, To make the people be respectful, loyal, and motivated, what should one do? The Master said, Regard them with austerity, and they will be respectful. Be filial and kind, and they will be loyal. Raise up the good to teach their deficiencies, and they will be motivated.

The phrase “filial and kind” is common in the Mician writings. The final phrase echoes 2:19 by stressing that officials should evoke self-motivation rather than compel obedience. The teaching aspect of public influence is again stressed, as in 13:29–30, but here in a civil, not a military, context. This saying marks a step in the evolution of the population toward something like citizens. The pairing of Aī-gūng and Jì Kāngdǔ reminds us (compare LY 5–6) that they no longer define sides in a legitimacy struggle, but are simply alternate spokesmen for rulership. The state has become *an entity in itself*, detached from the personality, and even the pedigree, of its ruler.

┌ 2:21. Someone said to Confucius, Why are you not in government? The Master said, The Shū says, “Be ye filial, only filial, be friendly toward your brothers, and you will contribute to the government.” This too, then, is being in government. Why should you speak of being “in government?”

As Legge notes, the use of the formal designation Confucius (Kǔngdǔ 孔子) implies a high-ranking questioner. This defense of being out of government feels like an anticipation of the retrenchment theory of LY 1, from a period when the Confucians, we infer, had in fact lost their position at the Lǔ court. Their court position, as of LY 2, may already be growing uncomfortable.

Shū 49 (Legge **Shoo** 535) contains the quoted line, but this text as we now have it is a later forgery, and whatever text 2:21 originally quoted from is lost. It evidently linked domestic and public virtue, a contemporary innovation. There is no point in discussing it as though it were an actual ancient record.

└ 2:22. The Master said, A man, but without fidelity: I don’t know if that can be. A large cart with no yoke, a small cart with no collar: how shall one make them go?

The form of this saying derives from the punning 3:3. A man assiduous in his personal duties is still playing a public part (2:21), but one who is unreliable at the personal level is hardly a man at all. The implication is that some things cannot be produced by education (compare 2:19/20), but must be present on their own. 2:22 approaches a definition of what is ethically human, but in active rather than descriptive terms: fidelity is something you *do*, not something you *are*. Note that in this nongovernmental saying (compare 2:21) the essential virtue is the lateral “fidelity” rather than the vertical “loyalty.” Society has its own structure; it is not simply an object of influence from above.

[E. Envoi: Guidelines for the Future]

┌ 2:23. Dǔ-jāng asked whether ten generations hence could be foreknown. The Master said, In the Yīn's continuing with the Syà rituals, what they subtracted and added can be known. In the Jōu's continuing with the Yīn rituals, what they subtracted and added can be known. And if someone should carry on after the Jōu, even though it were a hundred generations, it can be known.

The Confucians saw Lǔ as the inheritor of Jōu. This required that its rituals, said as recently as 3:9 to lack tradition, should be authentic. Authenticity is here supplied by a scientific extrapolation theory like that of Dzōu Yěn (2:1), which let *historical* changes be calculated with the same precision as *eclipses*. This highly positivistic confidence underlies the predictive historiography of the Dzwǒ Jwàn, and also led to an era of scientific forgery, in which many purportedly “ancient” texts were produced and, with rare exceptions, accepted.

└ 2:24. The Master said, If it is not his own spirit but he sacrifices to it, he is presumptuous. If he sees what is right but does not do it, he lacks courage.

This recalls the Quaker advice to shun the spiritual duty of *another* (the “spirit” in 2:24 is ancestral), but also enjoins one's *own* duty. Here, as in Plato's Laches (see Brooks **Courage**), military courage first evolves into moral courage.

The pairing is based on formal change (2:23) versus ethical permanency (2:24). Both are knowable, and thus constant, to the perceptive observer.

Interpolations

Whereas LY 12 and 13 were added to the end of the text, Dǔ-jīng preposed this chapter, as the angry LY 3 had been preposed. This had the effect of giving great structural prominence to the novel LY 2 emphasis on filiality. There was however little precedent for this idea in the classic Analects. Dǔ-jīng then did an even more outrageous thing, adding to the arch-classic LY 4 enough extra sayings (their relation to LY 2 ideas will be clear from the commentary below) to expand it from 16 to the standard 24, including *a whole series* on filiality.

For a complete finding list of interpolated passages, see page 329.

Added to LY 4

┌ *4:18. The Master said, In serving his father and mother, he remonstrates gently. If he sees that his ideas are not followed, then he again becomes dutiful without disobedience, and energetic without resentment. [4:18]

This extends into the private realm the principle of remonstrance earlier enunciated in 13:15 and later developed in 14:7. It also limits that principle by the ultimate authority of the parents, right or wrong.

└ *4:19. The Master said, While his father and mother are alive, he does not travel far; if he *does* travel, he must have a definite destination. [4:19]

It must always be possible to summon the son to fulfil overriding filial duties. There is a social bias in the maxim: official errands to definite places would have been allowed, but not open-ended speculative commercial excursions.

┌ *4:20. The Master said, If for three years he does not change from the ways of his father, he may be called filial. [4:20]

True filiality is shown only *after* the lifetime of the parents, by inner submission to their example. This is the first hint of a three-year period, not yet explicitly a mourning period, in the death of a parent. A dispute later broke out between Confucians and Micians over the attempt of the former to claim a three-year mourning period as ancient practice (compare MC 3A2). Some would-be royal lineages at this time probably had a tradition of extended observance of the death of a previous king. *4:20 emphasizes inner feeling in what might be called sentimental matters. It is incorporated as a guideline in the later 1:11.

└ *4:21. The Master said, The ages of one's father and mother cannot but be known. In the one case, he will be happy; in the other, he will be anxious. [4:21]

Again the note of appropriate feeling. The seemingly intimate matter of the parents' ages is of valid interest to the son in the proper exercise of filial responsibility; aged parents require extra watchfulness.

┌ *4:22. The Master said, If the words of those of old did not readily issue forth, it was that they were ashamed lest they should not come up to them. [4:22]

Their reluctance in making promises was out of concern at the difficulty of fulfilling them. See the governmental 12:3, and note that we are now in a section on the new, public virtue of fidelity (see 2:22, above).

└ *4:23. The Master said, Those who err on the side of strictness are few. [4:23]

This contrasts loose modern practice with the ancient scruple of 4:22.

└ *4:24. The Master said, The gentleman wants to be slow in giving his word, but quick in carrying it out. [4:24]

This gives an envoi to both the preceding sayings, balancing care in making promises with expeditiousness in carrying them out. Note that this virtue is exemplified by Dž-lù in *12:12b¹³. His new image as a man in an ethical hurry may thus not be entirely negative.

└ *4:25. The Master said, Virtue is not solitary; it must have neighbors. [4:25]

This is meant as a chapter envoi, echoing the "neighborhood" motif in 4:1. The point of this gnomic but beautiful saying is the social character of virtue: it may not be practiced in isolation. It may also be aimed at the contemporary Lǚ meditation school, who by the nature of their technique were prone to pursue "virtue" in isolation. This criticism gradually increased. 2:15 notes that the results of meditation ("thought") must be subjected to conscious processes ("study"). This is followed, in *15:31^{15a} (from later in the headship of Dž-jīng), by a rejection of meditation as wholly inferior to study. From LY 12 through LY 15 we see a progressive rejection of the meditation art which from LY 7 through LY 11 had clearly fascinated the Analects people, and at a certain level continued to do so afterward.

This saying was recognized as a quote from Confucius by no less than Nero Wolfe (Stout **Second** 116); a second Analectism (9:22) was spotted by Archie Goodwin (**Second** 160). The influence of the Analects, in reducing the early thuggish characterization of Archie, and establishing a "family" ambience in Stout's later novels, has been unaccountably ignored by literary historians.

Added to LY 13

*13:12. [The Master said, If there were one who could be a King, it would surely be only a generation until everyone was rǎn]. [13:12]

The distinctive usage wàng-jǚ 王者 “one who functions as a [true] King” or, in the context of the times, “one who could bring all the world under one rule,” occurs nowhere else in the Analects. Since in the present LY 13 it falls between two pairs of sayings (see p101), it must be an interpolation, but exactly when was it added? We append here a plausible but (in our view) ultimately incorrect argument, to show the difficulty of such determinations.

The term wàngjǚ occurs in Mencius. One might regard it as “Mencian,” and date *13:12 to the time of LY 2, after Mencius’s departure from Lǚ, and several years after his first interviews (0320 and later) with rulers of other states, on the assumption that the new term had by then reached Lǚ. But analysis of the Mencius interviews in MC 1 (Brooks **Interviews**; compare 12r) shows that half of them are interpolations. Eliminating these, we find that Mencius never uses this term in his interviews with two successive Kings of Lyáng (MC 1A1, most of 1A3, 15, and 1A6), covering the period 0320–0319, nor in his first interview with the King of Chí (MC 1B1, c0318). Mencius visited Lǚ at the beginning of Píng-gūng’s reign (MC 1B16), but since the term wàngjǚ was not yet in his repertoire, this is irrelevant. The term is absent from later Mencian interviews, through Dzōu Mǔ-gūng (MC 1B12, c0312). It first occurs in the second interview with Tǐng Wǎn-gūng (MC 1B14, c0307). Mencius thus does not seem to have used this term until a decade later than the composition of LY 2. We have therefore dated *13:12 to shortly after LY 15 (c0305); see p138.

┌ *13:22a. The Master said, The men of the south have a saying: “A man without stability cannot be made into a diviner or a physician.” Good! “If he does not stabilize his virtue, he may well incur shame.” [13:22a]

Folk sayings are also cited in contemporary Mician and Dàuist texts. For the stabilizing of omens, see Waley **Changes** 136f; the quote from Yì hexagram 32:3 (Wilhelm I 1/137) is the first Analects evidence for the existence of the Yì. This praise of ethical persistence echoes the educability motif of *13:21, above.

By a fortunate coincidence, we are able to demonstrate that divination of the Yì type was known in the south at exactly this period, namely c0317. The recently excavated tomb of a Chǔ official at present-day Bāushān (Weld **Cases**) contains a series of state documents spanning the years 0322–0316 and a more personal divination record apparently covering the tomb occupant’s last illness. It may not be improper to note the association, in that tomb and in this saying, between divination and medicine.

└ *13:22b. The Master said, One does not simply inquire of the oracle and then stop. [13:22b]

*13:22a hinted that virtue needs continuous action (hǐng 恆 “stabilization”); we here learn that a favorable prospect needs to be furthered by one’s own efforts. The emphasis on *continued human input*, to reach and maintain a desired condition, suggests the continuous ethical intensity of Dzǔngdǔ (8:3). It is also reminiscent of the linguistic repetition psychology of the Hopi culture (Whorf **Reality** 148f). Such devices here acquire an almost moral dimension. Virtue, like chance, as Pasteur would say, “favors the prepared mind.”

Reflections

We may note here some elements in LY 2 not found in LY 12–13, which perhaps reflect the school head Dž-jīng, who was now operating (as we infer) without the input of Mencius, who had left the school to begin his own career.

Conspicuous among these is the fact that LY 2 was preposed, rather than added to the tail of the previous Analects. This has a precedent in LY 3 but it is nevertheless a strong move; it probably sought to change the context of the older material. Second comes the skillful insertion of new ideas in the old material of LY 4:18–25. These include the filial piety emphasis, which would be consistent with Dž-jīng's hereditary position (as against his meritocratic challenger Mencius), and the teaching emphasis, which would be appropriate to his position as school head (note the strong policy orientation of LY 12–13). There is a certain tension here: the role of the hereditary and unquestioned leader of a school is different from that of one advisor among many at an essentially meritocratic court. We shall later see that under Dž-jīng's guidance the Lǔ Confucians fared badly at Píng-gūng's court.

On the policy or theory level itself, the development is more continuous with LY 12–13, though articulated with an intangibly greater rigidity. It may be interesting to see what ideas in LY 2 can be traced to prototypes in LY 12–13.

The third salient LY 2 emphasis is its faint but unmistakable interest in science, or what at that time leaned in that direction (2:1). This brings up some large comparative issues. Western readers tend to see their own early history in what might be called Galilean terms: a war between the church (representing arbitrary authority) and science (representing freedom of thought based on appeal to objective fact: “Eppur si muove”). From that viewpoint, it is tempting to see ritual as oppressive, and science as a bulwark of freedom. The alignment in early China seems different. Ritual had a potentially constitutional function, establishing limits of civility and mutuality between (3:19) and within (3:7), political strata, in both Sùng (de Bary **Rights** 187) and modern Confucianism (Ames **Rites** 209), whereas science in its Chinese form developed no tradition of its own, and tended to authenticate the divine and thus undiscussable authenticity claims of later-model emperors. The prophecy of Orwell (**1984**), not the plea of Feynman (**Joking** 338f), thus proved true. The moral for comparative history is that elements of culture such as astronomy may interact *in more than one way* with the other elements in the same culture.

The same caution applies with law. The Western model conceives of law as partaking of the regularity of nature (the *dào*) and thus above the ruler. Some late Warring States texts take this view of the *dào* (Turner **Theory** 74, Peerenboom **Law** 92–95), but they are theories and not invocable sanctions. The concept of *dào* was like that of the sage-king: a recommendation not grounded in any social reality. The fact seems to be that early Chinese laws were issued by rulers to keep the lower orders in line (Orwell **England** 261), and not framed by barons to keep the King in check (Cross **England** 141f).

Meanwhile, as of this chapter (c0317), Chín faced a strategic choice. In 0316 it chose to expand, not east, but south into Shǔ (Sage **Sichuan** 107–117). This doubled its area by other means than the benevolent policy urged in 13:4. Chǔ was thus induced to shift its efforts east, upsetting the balance of power. This had an effect on Lǔ politics which we will presently encounter in LY 15.

Jade Archer's Ring (see LY 14:5)

Height 4.5 cm (1.8 in). 04c/03c. Courtesy Freer Gallery of Art (39.25, reverse)