12
c0326

This is the age of the Hundred Schools, when rival theorists argue their views not only before rulers, but against each other. New topics of interest to the Confucians and other schools include the inner life of the individual, the role of the common people in the state, and the logic of definition. Older interests such as ritualism are also developed. This gives LY 12 a quality of turbulent excitement, quite different from the impassioned consistency of LY 3.

Mencius was probably with the Lǔ Confucian school at this time; he would begin his public career in 0320. His ideas as preserved in MC 1 are close to some found in LY 12, and suggest that he may have had a role in the chapter. Other parts of LY 12 seem anti-Mencian, and are probably attributable to the school head, Dž-jīng. This mixture might imply that Dž-jīng had come to the headship as a minor, creating an interim and giving Mencius limited scope. We may thus have here not only a jumble of ideas, but a tussle of personalities.

The numbering of passages is identical in the Legge text.

[A. Cryptic Answers]

┌ 12:1. Yén Ywǣn asked about rv́n. The Master said, To overcome the self and turn to propriety is rv́n. If one day he can overcome himself and turn to rv́n, the world will turn to rv́n along with him. To be rv́n comes from the self; does it then come from others? Yén Ywǣn said, I beg to ask for the details. The Master said, If it is improper, do not look at it. If it is improper, do not listen to it. If it is improper, do not speak of it. If it is improper, do not do it. Yén Ywǣn said, Though Hwéı is not quick, he begs to devote himself to this saying.

Yén Hwéı is linked with rv́n from LY 6:7, but whereas from 5:9 through 11:4 Hwéı is the great inferrer, in 12:1 he abjectly begs for details (mù 目). This rebukes "Hwéı" (though the advice – to overcome the self – evokes meditation technique; Mencius, as seen in MC 2A2, was also an adept), and reflects a more formal style between teacher and pupil. The four "details" (trivialized in the Three Monkeys of later art) make two pairs: do not promote impropriety either passively (by seeing or hearing it) or actively (by saying or doing it).

The passage turns on the relation between rv́n and lǐ, and the sense of the verb gwēı 歸 "[re]turn" (compare Kieschnick **Analects**). It says that: (1) rv́n is something to which one "goes" (it is voluntary) after overcoming the self (it is not innate); (2) it is conformity to lǐ "propriety" and has no content apart from lǐ; and (3) as in 3:9, it is a virtue not of the minister but of the ruler, and through him affects the whole populace. Gwēı "go to, give assent to" (the putative "ascribe [it] to him," as in Lau and Dawson, is here inappropriate), is used in DDJ 14, 16, and 22 of a "return" to a primal inner state of stillness; DDJ 22 adds that such a person influences the world. This mystical idea is thus here assimilated to a lǐ framework. The dàu of LY 4 was the way politics *ought* to be, but lǐ in the middle Analects is the ideal human and social condition. Such translations of rv́n as "manhood" (Pound **Analects** 23) or "manhood at its best" (Ware **Sayings** 18) owe much to this and the following passages.

└ 12:2. Jùng-gūng asked about rv́n. The Master said, He leaves the gate as though he were meeting an important visitor, he uses the people as though he were assisting at a great sacrifice. What he himself does not want, let him not do it to others. In the state he will have no resentment, in the family he will have no resentment. Jùng-gūng said, Though Yūng is not quick, he begs to devote himself to this saying.

This ends with the same obsequious formula as 12:1. The denial of one's "quickness" seems to be a gesture of respect to the teacher, who controls every stage of the learning process; Confucius used to ask more. This passage tells us that Jùng-gūng is actually [Rǎn] Yūng; on whom see 5:5, 6:1, and 11:3. 12:2 emphasizes respect for the gravity of one's task: the attitudes proper to court ceremony are the model for the secular bureaucratic and personnel functions. As in 12:1, rv́n dissolves into lǐ, but here still retaining the "otherness" of rv́n.

This Golden Rule (compare 5:12) is identical with Tobit 4:15 (c0175, the era of the Hàn silk route; Pfeiffer **Times** 274). As ascribed to Hillel (c040; Johnson **Jews** 127), it stands for the intuitive in religion, against the ritualism of Hillel's rival Shammai. 12:2 too, despite the sacrificial images, is at bottom a prescription for every aspect of life and work: a lateral maxim and not a hierarchical injunction; an "otherness" self-corrective for society.

┌ 12:3. Sīmǎ Nyóu asked about rv́n. The Master said, As to rv́n, one should speak hesitantly. He said, If one speaks hesitantly, is he rv́n? The Master said, Doing it is difficult; in speaking of it, how can one but hesitate?

Nyóu (for attempts to identify him, see Leslie **Notes** 2–26), unlike the polite 11:3 figures revisited in 12:1/2, is *really* dumb. He confuses modal chí 其 "should [speak]," which was intended, with pronoun chí "his [speaking]," thus coming out with the notion that a rv́n man is one who speaks circumspectly. The reply, in contrast to 12:2, is in the older tradition of "rv́n." See also 12:4.

└ 12:4. Sīmǎ Nyóu asked about the gentleman. The Master said, The gentleman does not grieve and does not fear. He said, If one does not grieve and does not fear, does that mean he is a gentleman? The Master said, On examining within he finds no flaw; why then should he grieve or fear?

As in 12:3, Nyóu takes the Master's *description* of a term as a *definition*; the Master then supplies an explanation of the description. As in 12:1, the idea of the gentleman as one possessing inner perfection suggests the meditation view. This passage is thus "progressive," whereas the paired 12:3 is "traditional."

┗ 12:5. Sīmǎ Nyóu, grieving, said, Other men all have brothers, I alone have none. Dž-syà said, Shāng has heard that death and life have their appointed limits, wealth and honor rest with heaven. If a gentleman is assiduous and omits nothing, is respectful to others and displays decorum, then within the Four Seas, all are his brothers. Why should a gentleman worry that he has no brothers?

Dž-syà's comments on fate and universal brotherhood sound like proverbs, and both are still proverbial in Chinese (Smith **Proverbs** 41). Leslie **Notes** 5–6 doubts the authenticity of 12:5, partly because Dž-syà appears in it, but Dž-syà in 3:8 was already a hero of the ritualist tradition. His appearance here seems consistent with that LY 3 trend, which here merges with the new populism.

[B. Open Answers]

┌ 12:6. Dž-jāng asked about "perceptive." The Master said, Insidious slanders and wounding accusations: if he does not act because of them, he can be called perceptive. Insidious slanders and wounding accusations: if he does not act because of them, he can be called detached.

These queries are handled more straightforwardly than those preceding: no humbling of the questioner, and no puns in the answer. But the sequence is the same, starting with description but leading to something like a definition. The essence of *this* definition is the parallel between míng 明 "clarity, insight" (for a link with the rise of written culture see Turner **Progress**) and ywǎn 遠 "distant, remote." The perceptive person is detached: perceiving the irritations, but not distracted by them. True perception is keeping the mind on the main point. Compare DDJ 16 (c0340): "To know the constant is called perceptive."

└ 12:7. Dž-gùng asked about government. The Master said, Enough food; enough weapons; the people having confidence in him. Dž-gùng said, If he could not help but let something go, of these three, which would be first? He said, Let the weapons go. Dž-gùng said, If he could not help but let something go, of these two, which would be first? He said, Let the food go. Since antiquity there has always been death, but if the people lack confidence, he cannot stand.

This, the first Analects definition of government, locates it in the confidence (syìn 信) of the people, not (GZ 3:18; Rickett **Guanzi** 95; Brooks **Gwǎndž 3**), in the government's ability to feed or protect them or the credibility (syìn 信) of its threat of punishment. This is the core of what we may call Confucian populism. Later passages will argue that the social requisites of food and defense follow from this basis. All rests on the need to gain the allegiance, and military service, of the newly important lower orders. A problem much argued at this time is how to get the conscript soldier to die for the state (GZ 1:3, Rickett **Guanzi** 54). The elite warrior had been trained from birth in an ethic of self-sacrifice; not so the jade carver, who tended to take a "little man" view of the value of his own life (Orwell **McGill** 120). The answer here proposed is a sense of identification with the state (Orwell **England** 266f).

The line about death is proverbial (Smith **Proverbs** 41), the third such passage in this chapter, and a suggestive index of its overall populist leaning. Whether such lines are *folk* proverbs (see Leslie **Notes** 6) is another matter.

┌ 12:8. Jí Dž-chźng said, The gentleman is simply substance; what is the point of style? Dž-gùng said, Regrettable is His Excellency's definition of the gentleman; a team of horses cannot overtake the tongue. Style is as important as substance, substance is as important as style. The hide of a tiger or leopard is indistinguishable from the hide of a dog or sheep.

"Team of horses" is yet another proverb, though not noted as such by Smith. Dž-gùng worries about the eminence of the questioner, a Wèı statesman, whose remark will get attention that no later refutation can counter. His own refutation affirms the style/substance dictum in 6:18, and insists that culture (the figured pelt of a game animal) is better than vulgarity (the utility hair of a domestic animal), even though they can be reduced to the same terms.

└ 12:9. Aī-gūng asked of Yǒu Rwò, It is a year of scarcity, and there is not enough for my needs; what is to be done? Yǒu Rwò replied, Why not tithe? He said, With *two* tithes, I still have not enough: how should I tithe? He replied, If the Hundred Families have enough, what ruler will not also have enough? But if the Hundred Families do *not* have enough, what ruler can expect to have enough?

The current tax rate was obviously two tithes (20%) of the harvest; Aī-gūng is disposed to increase this to cover needs (as later dynasties also discovered, it is in hard times that claims on the government granary, to relieve hardship, are greater). Yǒu Rwò (not, we may note, called "Yǒudž") suggests not merely contentment with the 20% (yielding a smaller amount since the total harvest is smaller), but a reduction to 10%, halving an already too-small revenue. This can only be a part of a current dialogue with the Chí theorists (GZ 3:11, 7:10; Rickett **Guanzi** 93f, 142), who felt that government apparatus was primary. Here, as in 12:7, the Analects holds that the *people* are primary: government wealth is a luxury that hard times may not permit. The ideal governmental food distribution system is to leave the food with the people in the first place.

Superimposed on the basic pairing, in this section, is an ABAB secondary pairing: 12:7 and 12:9 are parallel statements about statecraft.

[C. The State and the People]

┌ 12:10. Dž-jāng asked about exalting virtue and deciding contradictions. The Master said, To put first loyalty and fidelity, and to follow what is right, is to exalt virtue. When you love someone to wish them life, and when you hate someone to wish them death, first wishing life and then wishing death: this is a contradiction. "Truly it was not for her wealth / But only for the difference."

This has a complex background in contemporary discourse. Exalting the role of the virtuous and discriminating in cases of logical contrariety were topics of concern to the Micians. Rather than discuss them in Mician terms, the Master restates classic positions on loyalty (9:25) and right (4:10). He seems to give ground by citing a case of inconsistency (from Shī 188; Waley **Songs** #105, first loving and then hating the same person), but on reflection we see that the contradiction is purely a matter of inconsistency *within oneself*, and that such cases never arise if one's own dedication stays constant. The utility of virtue is that it obviates ethical legerdemain. This passage is not so much a reflection, as a contemptuous rejection, of contemporary logical sophistication.

└ 12:11. Chí Jǐng-gūng asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, The ruler is a ruler, the minister is a minister, the father is a father, the son is a son. The Prince said, Good indeed! Truly, if the ruler is not a ruler, the minister is not a minister, the father is not a father, and the son is not a son, even if I have millet, will I be able to eat it?

All social roles contribute: if they do not function, the resulting chaos threatens the state's survival. Note that the ruler's safety, as in 12:9, is an outcome and not a precondition of social stability: the people come first. This vivid statement of social interdependence (responding to GZ 2:45–46, Rickett **Guanzi** 78–79) is famous in Chinese tradition, and has been used (Rosemont **Mirror** 70–74) as a basis for evading the solipsism typical of most Western social philosophy.

┌ 12:12a. The Master said, One who from a single word could decide litigations – that would be Yóu, would it not?

Dž-lù's persona was redefined in 11:13b as daring and hasty. The idea is that he is prepared to hear only one side of a case, but this is *not enough;* it appears that contemporary jurisprudence required testimony from both sides. Yẁ 獄 "cases" later means "prisons," further supporting the possibility of incarceration punishments noted in 5:1n. There is ample evidence for 03c penal *servitude* (Brooks **Slavery**), and probably the mechanism for imposing such punishments existed by LY 12 (see the contemporary MZ 9 and 12; Mei **Ethical** 37 and 63).

└ 12:13. The Master said, In hearing lawsuits, I am no better than anybody else; what is required is to bring it about that there *are no* lawsuits.

Here is another kind of proceeding: sùng 訟 "lawsuits." On the evidence of the Shī (see Waley **Songs** 63–65), which may be projected from about this period, they were initiated as complaints of wronged individuals to local elders (or the prince himself? gūng 公 "prince" is phonetic in sùng 訟 "suit"). The yẁ of 12:12a may be contrasted as governmental proceedings, based on public prohibitions. This implies two levels: a common law allowing complaints of social wrong, administered by local elders, and looking to social reparations; and a penal law, defined by government proclamation, enforced by magistrates and leading to punishment by the state. The latter is a feature of what we now call Legalism, a governmental theory that arose in the 04c. Chí Legalism seems to have provided for appeals from local to central government courts (GZ 3:16, Rickett **Guanzi** 95). This connected the two social stratra, as part of the process of making one nation out of a stratified society: the population had access to central justice, and were liable to court-proclaimed law. Like the relation between ruler and minister in 3:9, that between ruler and populace is now not only *direct* (the early 05c innovation), but *reciprocal* (the mid 04c revolution). 12:13 is unimpressed; yóu 猶 "as bad as; no better than" is pejorative, implying that even a good man is only so good as a judge: judging is *intrinsically* flawed.

┌ 12:14. Dž-jāng asked about government. The Master said, Be occupied with it unwearyingly, carry it out loyally.

A precept for the bureaucrat rather than the ruler; this is the period when the bureaucratic state is being worked out in detail. It has already been found that administration takes both time and energy, and centers on national purpose. The comparable Chí Legalist maxim is GZ 2:42 (Rickett **Guanzi** 77).

└ 12:15. The Master said, If he learns widely in culture but limits it by ritual, he will surely manage not to overstep its proper boundary.

Identical with 6:27 except that it lacks the explicit subject "the gentleman," and that the meaning of lǐ has shifted from "propriety" to "ritual." It balances the progressive 12:14 by affirming that the old maxims are as good as the new concepts. The new concepts also claim to give new depth to the old maxims, and juxtapoxing the old maxims may help to emphasize this.

└ 12:16. The Master said, The gentleman completes the good in others, and does not complete their evil. The little man does the opposite of this.

An echo of the 12:14/15 contrast; compare also 4:7, which fits not too badly into the new, benevolent definition of rvn which LY 12 suddenly advances.

[D. The Theory of Rule]

┌ 12:17. Jì Kāngdž asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, Government is correcting. If you lead on a correct basis, who will dare *not* to be correct?

> This is a pun on jvèng 正 "correct" and jvèng 政 "government," understood as exemplary rather than coercive. If (as in 12:1) the ruler has the right qualities, those below will *spontaneously* acquire those qualities. We might call this the *assent* of the governed; their capacity to respond to good influence. The effect of an exemplary ruler is later called the transformation (hwà 化) of society; the term occurs in DDJ 37 (c0309) and in DDJ 57 (c0280), and often in Mencius. It is opposed to the *compulsion* theory, which "corrects" by force and fear.

└ 12:18. Jì Kāngdž was worried about robbers, and asked Confucius. Confucius replied, If somehow *you* had no desires, then even if you offered them rewards, they would not steal.

> This complements 12:17 as a maxim of *preventive* government: the ruler's lack of desire will cause desire to vanish from the people. The suppression of desire, central for the meditation adept, occurs in DDJ 12 and 19. Worry about robbers, implying increased wealth, is typical of this period; see DDJ 9 and 3.

┌ 12:19. Jì Kāngdž asked Confucius about government, saying, If I kill those who have not the Way in order to uphold those who have the Way, how would that be? Confucius replied, You are there to *govern*; what use have you for *killing*? If you desire the good, the people will be good. The virtue of the gentleman is the wind; the virtue of the little people is the grass. The wind on the grass will surely bend it.

> The temptation to achieve public order by public massacre is always with us. "Confucius" will have none of it, and instead reverts to the exemplar theory of 12:17/18, and adds a nature metaphor to show that the people are intrinsically malleable, and will conform themselves to the ruler (for a Mician parallel, see MZ 16, Mei **Ethical** 95–97; for a Legalist one, GZ 3:10, Rickett **Guanzi** 93). Note that appeal to nature has now entered the repertoire of argument.

└ 12:20. Dž-jāng asked, What must an officer do that he may be called successful? The Master said, What is it you mean by successful? Dž-jāng replied, In the state sure to be known, in the family sure to be known. The Master said, This is being known, it is not being successful. Now, as for successful: His character is straight and he loves the right; he inquires into words and observes appearances; he is considerate of those below him – in the state he is sure to be successful, in the family he is sure to be successful. Whereas, being known: his appearance adopts rźn but his conduct departs from it, and he can so continue without self-doubt – in the state he is sure to be known; in the family he is sure to be known.

> The theory of ruler influence as it applies to lower strata of government and other leadership. Dž-jāng asks about dá 達 "reaching the goal, accomplished" but he *describes* it as wèn 聞 "be heard of, be known." The contrast is between achieving an ethical goal and advancing a personal reputation. The diagnostic mark of the result-oriented officer is his wider ethical horizon; his otherness. The charisma of the self-confident phony is also acknowledged.

┌ 12:21. Fán Chí was going along on an excursion below the dance altar, and said, I venture to ask about exalting virtue, improving shortcomings, and deciding contradictions. The Master said, Good indeed is this question! To first serve and later attain, is that not exalting virtue? To attack one's evils, but never attack the evils of others, is that not improving shortcomings? "For the anger of a morning, to forget one's self and even one's kin," is that not a contradiction?

The list of topics is that of 12:10 with an extra one in the middle, and it is fair to compare the answers. Exalting virtue is here put in terms of motive: one acts for the result and not the reward. As to shortcomings, Fán Chí is reminded that his *own* shortcomings, not those of others, are his concern; another classic idea. For the third, the Master follows 12:10 by giving an example, not of deciding, but of contradiction itself. In 12:10 the temptation was fickle love; here, it is the distraction of anger. In both cases the passions are seen as enemies of the faculty of judgement. The implicit point (perhaps in opposition to the Micians, who emphasized logical consistency) is that there *are* no contradictions: when two desiderata seem to conflict, it is always intuitively obvious which is right.

With these similarities of theme, why is this passage not in section 12B?

└ 12:22. Fán Chí asked about rén. The Master said, Loving others. He asked about knowledge. The Master said, Knowing others. Fán Chí did not understand. The Master said, If you raise the straight and put them over the crooked, you make the crooked straight. Fán Chí withdrew. He saw Dž-syà and said, Just now I saw the Master and asked about knowledge, and the Master said, "If you raise the straight and put them over the crooked, you make the crooked straight." What does this mean? Dž-syà said, Rich indeed is this saying! When Shùn possessed All Under Heaven, he searched among the many and raised up Gāu-yáu, and those who were not rén drew away. When Tāng possessed All Under Heaven, he searched among the many and raised up Yī Yǐn, and those who were not rén drew away.

As though in answer to our preceding query, we get a rulership theory which shows that seeming personal-cultivation advice may have statecraft overtones.

In the complications of the second question, it is easy to miss the first, but it is momentous: rén is defined not as in LY 4, as a code which its possessor honors in all circumstances, but as the Mician principle of loving all others (this was the Mician answer to war; see MZ 14, Mei **Ethical** 78f). Together with the shifting of rén from a subject virtue to a ruler virtue (12:1), this implies the "compassionate government" (rén jùng) theory which Mencius later made his own (MC 1A5; Graham **Disputers** 113 notes that only "by the time of Mencius" does rén mean "benevolence," and here we have the corresponding, proto-Mencian, stage in the Analects). Next comes knowledge: not the ruler's administrative skill, but his capacity to recognize that skill in others. It is at this point that Fán Chí goes astray. He expects the ruler to *act* (compare 12:19), and finds instead that the ruler must *delegate*. The ruler's virtue is compassion, and precisely that compassion leads him to seek out – and, be it noted, from the multitude and not the from the civil list, another Mician touch – those with the skill to *implement* his compassion in practical administration.

The awkward question of where, in a universalist state, the not-rén are to draw away *to*, is not here raised; the answer tends to favor Legalist theories.

[E. Envoi: Friendship]

┌ 12:23. Dž-gùng asked about friends. The Master said, Inform them with loyalty and guide them with goodness, but if that does not suffice, then stop. Do not cause yourself embarrassment.

Having previously (at 12:20) made the transition from rulership to assistantship, we next have the question of lateral linkages among the assistants. 12:23 asserts that one should use leadership and influence among associates, and desist if the effort is unsuccessful. This is a major modification of the classic principle of being concerned only with *one's own* shortcomings (see 4:14). It means that the new ethics is not mere group solidarity, but gives wider scope to the power of positive example. Note that the extension does not go so far as to require the denunciation of erring associates, a requirement that the contemporary Chí Legalists did make (see most dramatically 13:18). As 12:19 might have put it, you are there to influence, not to denounce. With the explicit understanding, in 12:23, that if your influence does not avail, you may validly distance yourself from what, in the end, can only be a perilous association.

└ 12:24. Dzvngdž said, The gentleman with his culture gathers friends, and with his friends supports rv́n.

The previous saying tells us how to distance ourselves from friends, and we may next wonder how to attract them, and what does the circle of friends, once it comes into being by attraction, accomplish in the state? The answer is that friends are attracted by sharing the same cultural values, and, once attracted, become a strong social force in support of those values. Friends do not develop an agenda: they serve the agenda that brought them together in the first place. With this maxim, the solitary 05c warrior code of LY 4 is adapted to the needs and awarenesses of the new 04c society. What we learn here is that society is not *somewhere else:* every interaction, among colleagues as well as on the street, and more consequentially among colleagues than on the street, shapes society. Hence the importance, newly recognized in this period, of right interactions.

Interpolations

As of this writing, we have not found interpolated passages which suggest an association with LY 12. This finding is subject to reconsideration in the light of further study, but it is consistent with our inference about LY 12: that it was put together during the minority of the school head Dž-jīng, possibly with a contribution from Mencius, and presumably with general oversight by the Kŭng elders. One can readily imagine the latter authorizing the composition of new material to keep the school abreast of Chí Legalism and other novelties, but stopping short of allowing creative access to the older layers of the text.

Mencius, whose adjusted traditional dates are 0387–0303, was over 60 as of our hypothesized completion date for LY 12 (c0326). We know from the genuine interviews in MC 1 that Mencius was ambitious and proud (he is even more ambitious and proud in the later *additions* to MC 1). It is conceivable that he had hoped to head the Lŭ school himself, and that his contribution to LY 12, if such it was, represented a bid for local ideological significance.

For a complete finding list of interpolated passages, see page 329.

Reflections

Among the excitements of LY 12 are its evident contact with Dàuist and Legalist ideas, in the DDJ and GZ, respectively. Dàuist ideas tend to be *sources* of Analects doctrine, whereas Legalist ones cause reactions and reformulation, but both are important. So are those from Mician sources. A few LY 12 Mician themes may be mentioned here. One is reliance on ancient, *pre-Jōu* rulers as models of administrative perfection (Tāng in 12:22 is the founder of Shāng; Shùn is supposed to have been a pre-Shāng ruler). This antiquarian device, which is soon adopted by later Confucianism, is here a novelty. Contemporary Mician writings refer to a whole string of these ancient rulers; the Analects seems to be using the tactic in self-defense. Mician influence is also seen in the meritocratic motif in 12:22 ("Esteem for Ability," MZ 8–10, Mei **Ethical** 30f, is a central Mician tenet). The characteristic Mician term shàn 善 "good" (12:19, compare the more tentative 11:19a), and above all the definition of Confucian rv́n as Mician àı in 12:22, attest a Mician philosophic presence.

LY 12 contains at least two theories of government. One is authoritarian (if beneficent in method), and is based on the Dàuist idea of the transforming sage (section 12C). The other, more participative and upward-determined, may be Mician (12D). In one, the ruler produces a benign society through direct, almost magical, influence; in the other, he produces it by feeling keenly the need for it, and using others to achieve the actual result. Thus 12C and 12D. What then of 12A and 12B? Has the chapter an overall theory, as LY 3 did? Does the envoi summarize the end, or return symmetrically to the beginning? All these questions make practicable weekend exercises.

Another question is the Mencian one. Our conclusion, from rhetorical and linguistic evidence, is that only the following Mencius passages are actual transcripts: 1A1, 1A3a (only through the phrase "the beginning of royal government"), 1A5, 1A6, 1B1, 1B9, 1B10, and 1B12–16. The ideas and assumptions they contain are not many. All seem to us to be prefigured in this chapter and in LY 13. MC 1B1, for instance, where the ruler's tenderness of heart is claimed to be a sufficient beginning for the reform of society and the dominion of the world, seems to reflect LY 12:22. It is probably fruitful to regard LY 12–13 as constituting evidence of the early Mencius before the onset of his formal career in MC 1A1 (0320). We rarely have the chance to examine a Chinese thinker up close; the "Confucius" of most of the Analects is a mere figment of convenience, emblematic of continuity while receptive to novelty. But here, possibly, is a real person. The LY 12–13 and early MC 1 material would probably repay serious study.

Much of the technical and social change we have noted for this period is discovered by observing the appearance of new words for new objects: silk, tailored clothing, the practice of medicine, and many others. More difficult is the detection of differences despite use of the *same* term. Consider friendship. In 5:25 and 8:5, it implies mere friendly feelings, while 9:25 ("do not befriend moral inferiors") suggests a more permanent association. Something like a mutual moral pressure group, supporting the redefined virtue rv́n, has emerged by 12:23/24. This, notably, is a lateral and not a vertical social institution. This recognition of the validity of lateral social institutions is one more instance of the widening horizon for the individual in 04c society.

Bronze Mirror (see p106 and p108)
Diameter 11·7 cm (4·6 in). 04c. Courtesy Freer Gallery of Art (74·120)